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ABSTRACT 
Policy-makers have increasingly come to focus on the role of 
economic factors in fuelling or dampening regional and border 
conflicts. This issue can be highly relevant in the case of non-
recognized entities where some economic interests may benefit from 
the resulting distortions while others would gain if the political 
situation were regularised. The experience in Cyprus is interesting 
in this regard, as it seems that economic factors probably played a 
significant role in the referenda results of April 2004. Against this 
backdrop, this paper explores the prospects and priorities in Cyprus 
by addressing a number of relevant theoretical and policy questions, 
including: the potential influence of economic factors on conflict 
resolution; the role played by economics in the failure of the Spring 
2004 discussions; the question of the income disparity between north 
and south; and the synergies that could be unlocked in a converging 
intra-Cyprus economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy-makers have increasingly come to focus on the role of economic factors 
in fuelling or dampening regional and border conflicts. This issue can be highly 
relevant in the case of non-recognized entities, such as those that exist in the 
Caucasus and in northern Cyprus. Where a "would-be" state is not recognized 
by some of its neighbours or potential trading partners, a range of economic 
factors is brought into play. For example, some economic interests may benefit 
from the resulting distortions in external trade and in the economic system 
more generally. Other interests, by contrast, would gain if the political situation 
were regularised and such distortions ended. Yet others might face conflicting 
incentives as they fear the upfront costs of change yet see potential longer-run 
gains for themselves or for younger generations. 
The experience in Cyprus is interesting in this regard for several reasons. It 
seems that economic factors probably played a significant role in the referenda 
results of April 2004, although perceptions of these factors may not always 
have been accurate at the time. Moreover, concrete efforts have been made 
since the referenda to start addressing distortions in the absence of a political 
settlement. For example, a legal channel has been created for trade between 
north and south in an attempt to reduce trade distortions and build constructive 
economic relations; and some attempts have also been made to find property 
solutions in the north that would be internationally accepted. Finally, and 
importantly, the economic context in Cyprus is not stationary: developments on 
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the ground, as they interact with political currents, may contribute to shaping 
constituencies for or against a settlement in the future. 
Since April 2004, informal discussions have continued among economists on 
the two sides concerning, more specifically, the scope for “economic 
convergence” between north and south to interact with political convergence in 
making progress towards reunification. (One forum for such exchanges has 
been the Wolfson Cyprus Group, founded by the author of this Discussion 
Paper). The issue of economic convergence initially received particular 
attention in Cyprus because of income disparities between north and south. But 
it has a wider resonance also. The term is used to refer to three processes which 
are distinct, but which have the potential to be mutually reinforcing – and 
which are used in this paper as a unifying framework in which to think about 
the interaction between economics and politics in Cyprus: the convergence of 
incomes in Cyprus towards the EU average; the convergence of incomes in the 
north towards those in the south; and the convergence of institutional and 
market structures between north and south. Convergence in each of these 
respects is important in its own right and also because it may lay a basis for 
political dynamics, by changing the opportunities and incentives facing 
citizens. 
In this perspective, the April 2006 ECPR workshop in Nicosia on “Cyprus – A 
Conflict at the Crossroads,” which formed the basis for the present paper, and 
the book in which it will appear in 2008, was truly timely. The agreement in 
February 2006 on EU financial aid for northern Cyprus of €139 million had just 
provided one reason to think carefully about channels to promote growth and 
convergence. The almost simultaneous Annan-Papadopoulos communiqué 
opened the question of what economic issues would be valuable to consider in 
technical discussions between north and south in a perspective of convergence 
and reunification.  
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From an economic standpoint, indeed, it can be argued that Cyprus is still 
standing at a crossroads. In this situation, convergent or divergent economic 
incentives – and their interaction with key political factors – may have the 
potential to significantly influence future outcomes in the island. Against this 
backdrop, seven questions are highlighted in this paper, to help shed light on 
prospects and priorities in Cyprus, and potentially lessons for other cases:    
 The potential influence of economic factors on conflict resolution, 
including assessments in the recently emerging literature on this topic. 
 The role played by economics in the failure of the Spring 2004 
discussions. 
 The question of the income disparity between north and south. 
 The synergies that could be unlocked in a converging intra-Cyprus 
economy. 
 The scope for economic reforms to contribute to convergence. 
 The risk that, if opportunities are missed now, divergent forces may 
dominate. 
 Possible wider lessons of this analysis for Cyprus and other conflict 
situations. 
 
2. The potential role of economic influences on conflict resolution 
Recent literature has highlighted the potential importance of economic 
influences in unrecognized entities and in other cases of unresolved civil or 
military tensions. The central message in this literature is that economic 
exchanges can play a positive or a negative role in promoting normalization, 
depending in part on the balance of incentives. On the one hand, rent-seekers 
can benefit from distortions created by the unresolved status quo, and have a 
vested interest in its continuation. On the other hand many parties stand to 
benefit from a restoration of open and legal exchanges.  
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Champlain (2004) notes, for example, that informal economic relations in 
unrecognized entities in the South Caucasus can be seen as a coping 
mechanism, but may also provide space for rent-seeking and the emergence of 
‘gate-keepers’ protecting huge profits, thus amplifying tensions and reducing 
interest in political solutions. Banfield et al. (2006) review the impact of private 
business in some twenty conflict and post-conflict cases. They, too, see 
examples of “conflict opportunism,” and note that this may directly sustain 
military operations or the suppression of civil freedoms. But they highlight the 
scope for private businesses (especially SMEs) to dampen conflicts by creating 
pockets of mutual understanding and shared interest. They identify cases where 
business personalities have played a valuable role – as insiders in negotiations, 
or as outsiders building trust and providing logistical support for a settlement.  
More generally, Smith (2004), discussing unrecognized entities in the South 
Caucasus, notes that sustainable peace in the region will require economic 
opportunity, and thus ultimately a thriving business sector operating in 
internationally recognized legal and institutional frameworks. The relevance of 
trade incentives to this is confirmed by recent literature on economic 
institutions. For example, research on economic openness indicates that good 
institutions are favoured by an environment that is not conducive to rent-
seeking, and that here external factors play an important role. Specifically, 
trade openness is strongly associated with better economic institutions, and 
hence improved chances of strong and sustained growth (IMF 2005). Openness 
and undistorted trade can be seen as factors favouring sustainable growth and 
thus helping to buttress peace. 
The relevance of these considerations in the case of Cyprus is clear. Some 
interest groups on the island (or in Turkey) may flourish on rents derived from 
distorted trade patterns, and become defenders of the status quo. Others, 
including consumers, may see major gains if trade is regularized. Property 
rights in the north are contested, and this adversely affects foreign investment 
and banking. Some new possessors of housing or commercial real estate, after 
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population movements, may have developed a vested interest in avoiding 
regularization, unless their new holdings are in some way acknowledged and 
protected; and parties throughout the island are concerned to achieve 
compensation for property losses experienced during those periods of 
population movement.  
More broadly, a regularization of political relations in Cyprus could lead to 
significant economic disruption as the structure of production (and the role of 
the state in supporting production) change in the north – a possibility illustrated 
in a more systemic fashion during the economic transition from in eastern 
Europe. Such disruption may be a concern for the population; but, nonetheless, 
they may see it as a price worth paying to secure improved medium-term 
prospects. Changes in trading patterns can also affect neighbours: economic 
actors in a regularised northern economy might emerge either as strong 
competitors or as valuable partners in markets (such as tourism and education) 
that are important to neighbours, including in the south. Economic interests 
located in these neighbours may thus be drawn into play.  
In all these fields, finally, perceptions may or may not be well-founded. In 
conflict situations, information flows can be as distorted as trade flows. It is 
plausible that political opinions may at times be influenced by incorrect 
perceptions of the economic realities, and in such circumstances the role of 
credible analysts – perhaps from international organizations or from academia 
– could be valuable in correcting misperceptions. At all events, there can be 
little doubt that economic factors, and the perception of such factors, are a 
potentially important influence on conflict resolution. 
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3. Economics and the Spring 2004 Reunification Talks 
In the Cyprus discussions three years ago, during which the author of this paper 
was an economic adviser to the UN team, there was only limited time to 
analyse in depth the economic challenges of reunification. Partly as a result, 
ome key issues were ever fully analysed from an economic standpoint, and this 
added to the inherent difficulty of reaching political agreement on them. In  
particular, three important questions were not effectively resolved during 
discussions:   
 
 What was the income gap between north and south? A major concern on 
both  sides, cross-cutting many key issues, lay in the potential costs and 
forms of support for income convergence within the island. But both 
sides over-estimated this gap during the discussions, and were probably 
too pessimistic on convergence prospects (see section 4 below). 
 What would reunification cost, and who would pay? Even at a late stage 
in the talks some key costs were unquantified, including steps needed to 
regularize public and private sector balance sheets in the north. 
Moreover the strategy for resettlement in the north was still at a 
formative stage, with a range of possible costs and risks. 
 How could a credible fiscal federalism be created, which would work 
well in the EU framework? The exchanges did not achieve a shared 
vision of the challenge, which needed to be addressed in the context of 
an island with a relatively heavily indebted south; an unquantifiably 
indebted north; an ex-reunification fiscal deficit peaking at perhaps 10 
percent of GDP; an exchange rate peg; and plans for early euro 
adoption. 
 
These questions were recognized to be important, and were debated, but were 
not resolved with a deep consensus. A fourth question is no less important, but 
received even less attention:  
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 How might the dynamics of the two economies – north and south – 
evolve in the aftermath of reunification? What would be the 
convergence mechanisms and requirements? What challenges would 
have to be faced in the labour market? Would firms in the south face 
opportunities or threats, and in which sectors? Would labour in the south 
stand to win or lose in terms of income growth over the medium term, 
and under what conditions? Could the north be assured that there would 
be mechanisms – public and private – to finance the infrastructure 
needed to benefit from intra-Cyprus convergence and access to new 
markets? 
These are not necessarily elements that could be “planned” in advance, in the 
old-fashioned sense of state planning. But some shared analytical framework 
and sense of common policy priorities seem essential for a successful economic 
outcome.  
Adressing such questions upfront would help ensure that there is greater clarity 
among voters about the future – and this could have complex effects on their 
assessments and preferences compared with the situation in April 2004.  At that 
time, voters may have been guided by economic perceptions that, in some 
cases, left important considerations out of account.  
Specifically, in the north, for example, there was in April 2004 a convincing 
intuition that EU membership offered a source of income convergence and new 
job opportunities. But convergence is highly policy-dependent: voters may 
have underestimated the adjustments needed to achieve sustained convergence. 
Economic liberalization and reform of the public sector are agendas that clearly 
need to be pursued in the north under all circumstances, but they will bring 
some painful adjustments as they affect different interest groups in the 
economy. 
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Such adjustments are easier if undertaken at a time of buoyant growth. Thus, in 
principle, reform and conflict resolution may work in a mutually-reinforcing 
manner. Nonetheless, the share of the capital stock that could prove unviable, 
and the number of jobs that may be lost, during such a reorientation should not 
be underestimated.  
These factors can be important, or course, in any environment where the 
economy has been distorted, as in the case of the transition economies. The 
additional consideration in a conflict situation is that they may influence not 
only the willingness to support reform but the readiness to support and act in 
favour of conflict resolution and, where relevant, legalization of an entity's 
status. In Cyprus, they represent a potentially negative factor that inevitably 
will need to be addressed. 
In the case of northern Cyprus, a bridge in this direction (discussed further 
below) would be the staged shadowing of the acquis communautaire (which is 
formally suspended in the north), thus moving to harmonize with the EU before 
a settlement. However, constraints on the trade of the north reduce the scope to 
benefit from a reorientation of the economy. The economic incentives and 
opportunities to gain from a full shadowing of the acquis communautaire are 
not present. Moreover, hard budget constraints have not been fully applied by 
Turkey, the principal aid donor, to set the stage for more fundamental public 
sector reforms. 
By contrast, in the south, as noted in the retrospective report of former UN 
Secretary-General Annan, voters may have perceived mainly the risks of 
reunification, including the economic and financial risks: uncertainties or costs 
that could hamper growth after 30 years of progress. This may have left 
important factors out of account: there is substantial scope for synergies in 
economic development that would also benefit the south. As acknowledged in 
the authorities’ submissions for the EU’s Lisbon dialogue on reforms that can 
foster growth and jobs, the economy in the south needs continuing structural 
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changes to enhance competitiveness. reunification – on the right terms – can be 
a source of stimulus, synergy and opportunity.  
One should note also, from the standpoint of people in the south, that the 
economics of the property settlement were complex, finalized at a late stage, 
and perhaps not widely understood: people were not convinced it was in their 
true interest. A recent study by Stelios Platis and others sheds some interesting 
light on the dynamics of the proposed Property Board, which can be interpreted 
rather favourably (Platis et al, 2005). 
These considerations could lead to a schematic representation of the interests 
that might win or lose from reunification in Cyprus – though in some cases the 
scope for gain or loss may be misperceived, and in some cases also policy 
actions or developments on the ground could change the relevant perceptions in 
the future (for a discussion, see Section 5 below). Further work to clarify this 
issue, to find ways of addressing concerns, and to correct mistaken perceptions, 
would be a valuable preamble to resumed negotiations. 
To be clear, during the UN-sponsored discussions in 2002-04, there was very 
limited time to explore these issues. But, if economics is indeed an important 
driver in political affairs, then the negotiators were labouring under a 
significant disadvantage. One conclusion would be that, if we do not learn from 
this history, we may repeat it – at some point re-entering discussions with a 
sense of urgency, but on the economic front being still rather ill-prepared. 
Informal bodies, such as the Wolfson Cyprus Group, have organized bi-
communal discussions on key economic issues, but these have taken place 
against a political backdrop that has been unpromising for a re-start of formal 
technical talks.  
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4. The income disparity between north and south 
During the past three years, growth has accelerated in both north and south. 
This narrowed the intra-island income gap, and boosted convergence towards 
average EU income levels. In the south, growth averaged two percent during 
the run-up to EU membership, but then accelerated to nearly four percent in 
2004-5, and is set to remain at this level over the next two years. In 2004 per 
capita GDP stood at 84 percent of the EU average. In the north, growth 
averaged 6 percent in 2001-2, in the wake of economic volatility in Turkey and 
a banking crisis. It accelerated in 2003, and GDP rose by 42 percent over the 
three years to 2005. With the acceleration of growth in the north, the income 
gap across the island has been shrinking, although the recent pace and pattern 
of growth in the north does not appear fully sustainable.  
 
Table 1. Real GDP growth rates in the north and the south (in percent) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
South 4.1 2.1 1.9 3.8 3.9 
North 5.4 6.9 11.4 15.4 10.6 
 
In addition, work in the World Bank has pointed to an income gap between 
north and south that is much narrower than assumed at the time of the Annan 
Plan talks. This is an important issue, since the perception of a massive 
inequality of living standards may have been an important element underlying 
the concerns on both sides in the negotiations, and also influencing the 
referenda outturns.  
The conventional wisdom was that living standards in the north lag very far 
behind standards in the south, and were not catching up with them. Ayres 
(2003), while warning of measurement hazards, cited EU per capita income 
data for 2000 that contrast a level of US$ 6000 in the north with US$ 13000 in 
the south. The convergence projections of Mehmet (2004) start from a disparity 
of 60 percent between income levels. The 2004 report on the Annan plan by 
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Eichengreen et al. bases its convergence projections on a 60 percent wage gap.  
In sum, published estimates at that time were based on market exchange rates, 
and broadly suggested that incomes in the north were around two-fifths the 
level in the south. The authors of some studies thus foresaw very long catch-up 
periods. For example, Eichengreen et al. warn that, even on a benign scenario, 
incomes in the north might still be only 62 percent of levels in the south by 
2020. However, data available to the authors at that time did not allow 
comparisons to be made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. 
The World Bank has sought to adjust data roughly to a PPP  basis, as shown 
below.  The World Bank estimates suggest that the level of living standards in 
the north could be as much as three-quarters of that prevailing in the south. 
These estimates could perhaps be biased upwards, to the extent that the PPP 
adjusters used in these calculations are based on price levels in Turkey, since 
data are not available for the north. Moreover, in assessing living standards, it 
should be borne in mind that the economy of the north benefits from very 
sizable external assistance, mainly from Turkey – and in the event of 
reunification there would be a major adjustment to more open economic 
conditions.  On the other hand, it seems clear that earlier estimates seriously 
overestimated the living standards gap, and this sheds new light on the context 
of a reunification settlement. 
 
Table 2. Per capita income in north and south in 2004 (current US $, 000s) 
 Nominal World Bank Atlas PPP-corrected 
North 8.1 7.2 14.8 
North – revised base 9.2 8.2 16.9 
South 19.4 17.6 22.3 
Ratio(north: south)  42 41 66 
Ratio - revised base 48 47 76 
Source: IBRD Mimeo. Statistical Note: The World Bank Atlas method for correcting GNI takes 
account of nominal exchange rate fluctuations; PPP estimates correct for differences in purchasing 
power. The revised data base takes account of the input-output matrix developed to assess the adequacy 
of GDP data in the north by extending coverage of the formal private sector (but not the informal 
sector, which would add a further 20-35 percent to estimates of economic activity). 
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5. Synergies in a Converging Intra-Cyprus Economy 
When we look for gains from economic integration, one of our first thoughts as 
economists is to exploit sectoral complementarities and benefit from 
comparative advantage. In Cyprus, by contrast, the two economies are 
sectorally quite similar in structure and in comparative advantage. So sectoral 
synergies, rather than sectoral complementarity, are likely to be an important 
source of gains. These could be important in several areas.  
There seem, first, to be major synergies available in tourism. Exploiting these 
now is rather difficult in terms of property rights. But it is easy to see how one-
time visitors to the south could be tempted back by unexplored sites and the 
important (though fragile) environmentally appealing areas in the north. 
Moreover, this is not a win-lose proposition. A night gained in the north may 
bring one in the south along with it. In fact, convergence in tourism could help 
restyle the tourist-market image of the south by adding new cultural 
destinations and beaches. 
Education is another growth sector. Northern academics rightly stress 
continuing quality challenges, but they have shed light on the way ahead. 
Cyprus has exceptional positioning to deliver higher education products to an 
East Mediterranean market, and indeed further afield in the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. An island-wide education network – in an 
atmosphere of ethnic, linguistic and religious tolerance – is potentially a trump 
card in service sector development.  
Business services represent a regional market of huge promise, and one where 
new and potential competitors are poised to expand market share. The years of 
early EU membership offer an unprecedented opportunity to build on existing 
success in the south. For the north this is also a field in which important 
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opportunities exist – but are handicapped in a number of ways by the political 
status quo.  
 
Table 3. Selected Economic Factors that may have affected Perceptions 
 Possible perceptions in April 2004 Scope for Perceptions to Evolve 
 north south north South 
Perceived 
impact on living 
standards 
Strong hopes of 
higher living 
standards 
Some concern 
success of south 
could erode 
More awareness 
of transition to 
prepare change 
Analysis may 
help highlight 
real synergies 
Perceived effect 
on monetary 
stability 
Would bring 
greater stability 
Might weaken 
sound monetary 
regime 
Euro adoption in 
south in 2008 to 
confirm this 
Euro adoption 
removes this 
major concern 
Perceived effect 
on fiscal 
management 
"Pain" of fiscal 
reform probably 
under-estimated 
Strong concern 
about fiscal 
viability 
Progress now 
would allow a 
transition period 
Ex ante talks on 
fiscal federalism 
could reassure 
Perceived effect 
on business 
interests 
Great hopes from 
direct trade and 
tourism 
Concern about 
competition in, 
e.g., tourism 
Must recognize 
extent of likely 
restructuring  
Sectoral studies 
could reveal 
positive scope 
Perceived effect 
on regional role 
Scope to broaden 
regional trade 
links 
(Settlement with 
Turkey positive 
potential) 
Must internalize 
need to upgrade 
competitiveness 
Studies could role 
as enhanced 
regional hub 
Perceived 
impactof 
property 
settlement 
Some disruption 
feared from 
movements 
Negative on 
credibility of 
proposed deal  
Situation harder, 
though attempts 
at local process 
This remains a 
major (and now 
tougher) hurdle 
  
 
Manufacturing industry is not a sector of the future in terms of GDP share, but 
it remains important. Moreover it seems to be underdeveloped in the north, 
where there is nonetheless a skilled labour force. Convergence could be seen as 
part of a broader philosophy of changing not just market access but also 
economic incentives in the north – which have not prevented economic 
development but which are public sector-oriented and very aid-dependent. To 
the extent there is an anti-export bias in the north this could be corrected. 
Nonetheless, it may be that full liberalization and opening of the economy of 
the north triggers a major adjustment in the traded good sector, and it will be 
important to respond via actions that enhance flexibility and skills in the labour 
market – not via a step-up in subsidies.These points may seem obvious. But 
they may not be the economics that the man and woman in the street, three 
years ago, had at the back of their minds.  
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Over time, convergence through liberalized markets will tend to foster viable 
and outward-looking economic opportunities – although this will involve 
adjustment stresses. Divergence that routes the trade of the north through 
distorted channels will embed the special interests which benefit from those 
channels; and such interests  will suffer, inevitably, when those distortions are 
removed. It may be helpful at this stage to summarise schematically some of 
the actual and perceived economic influences that may be relevant to forward 
movement on reunification (Table 3) Clearly the points of view in this table 
should be viewed as stylized: in reality there were many varying interests and 
no doubt wide spectrums of opinion on each side. 
 
6. Economic reforms and the convergence challenge 
The macroeconomic and structural reforms in discussion or underway in both 
the north and the south are conceived in terms of accelerating sustainable 
growth and thus income convergence toward the EU average.  In the case of the 
south this implies an upgrading of the growth rate registered over the past few 
years. In the north, by contrast, growth has recently risen to unsustainable 
levels, and a slowdown is already underway. With sound policies, the two 
economies should settle on a path of stable “internal” and “external” 
convergence. The design and process of economic reform can help accelerate 
income convergence in both respects, and can also foster greater structural 
convergence within Cyprus. 
First, in the north the acquis communautaire represents a network of 
institutional and policy reforms that can accelerate economic integration with 
the south and the rest of the EU. Presently, of course, the acquis is suspended 
in the north; but the scope exists to shadow it, and in a number of areas 
progress has already been achieved. Priority areas include those essential for a 
single market in goods and services – such as phyto-sanitary requirements, 
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certification of origin of products, competition policy, etc. Obviously there is 
rich experience in the south with adopting the acquis in an economy similar in 
structure to that of the north. It would be perverse if problems with EU 
financing slowed the shadowing of the acquis in the north. Still more so if 
problems concerning recognition that complicate the use of “official” offices or 
communications involving “official” job-titles – or indeed just a negative 
psychology on either side – left the north without intra-Cyprus assistance as 
regards experience in adopting the acquis. The agreement on the EU aid 
package can, inter alia, help catalyze progress on the acquis. 
Second, public finance reforms in the north can help address very positively a 
number of concerns that surfaced in the 2004 discussions on economic issues. 
It should shift resources from current to investment expenditure; cut the fiscal 
deficit; and deal with the issue of outstanding loans to publicly-owned 
enterprises, which is important for incentives in the banking system. Placing 
the public finances in the north on a viable basis, inter alia by clarifying public 
and external debt levels, represents both a key to improving the investment 
climate and a major contribution to the reunification agenda.  
It may be considered also that euro adoption (preceding reunification) will 
reduce fiscal and financial concerns in the south, to the extent that any risks to 
the exchange rate peg non longer apply, and the costs of reunification do not 
risk creating problems in observance of the Maastricht fiscal deficit reference 
value. In some ways, however, adoption of the euro will change rather than 
eliminate such concerns; and the absence of exchange market discipline is not 
an unmitigated gain. The advent of the euro also removes the exchange rate as 
a source of flexibility and adjustment. In the south, of course, the long-standing 
nature of the Cyprus pound peg has not cast it in the role of an adjustment 
instrument. The north, however, has “benefited” periodically from a safety 
valve (depreciation of the Turkish Lira) when its competitiveness had become 
weak.  
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It is true that the membership of monetary union would resolve some central 
banking issues. It also brings strong fiscal commitments under the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Moreover, in both north and south the real sector will need to 
display flexibility in order to sustain growth, as relative resources are 
reallocated under reunification – particularly if neither side has the exchange 
rate available as an a safety valve. It is important also to have some sense in 
advance where there will be winners and losers, so as to identify skill needs and 
strengthen mechanisms to support adjustment.  
Third, for the north and also the south, there is scope more generally for 
synergy in pursuing economic reforms. Several  examples spring to mind. For 
example, both north and south need to embark on social security reform to 
address the challenge of population ageing. It would make great sense for the 
reforms to be designed in ways that have broad compatibility. More generally, 
the labour market is a key area in which convergence is taking place.  It would 
be desirable to put in place a framework assuring the compatibility or 
portability of different types of benefits and regulations between north and 
south. At a still more general level, the Lisbon agenda is clearly relevant to 
both parts of the island, where there will be a continuing need to move up-
market to meet competition from lower wage economies. This process is 
crucial in unlocking more rapid growth, which in turn will ease concerns (in 
both north and south) about shocks and adjustments involved in economic 
convergence and reunification.  
So there is scope to meet various economic reform challenges in Cyprus 
through a process of coordination between north and south – however informal 
– in the broad framework of the acquis communautaire. Or one might embark 
on the economic future with scant regard to this, but that is a strategy that will 
not facilitate the working of convergence mechanisms in the labour market or 
elsewhere. The past three years, despite some progress on the Green Line, seem 
to have seen the gradual embedding of an uncoordinated approach to reform. 
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7. The Risks That Economic Gravity May Foster Divergence 
An economic reform agenda is not only important in its own right for both 
economies: it can also enhance economic constituencies for reunification – 
indeed it might serve as a form of high-level confidence building approach. The 
alternative may be that opportunities to foster convergence begin to slip away. 
To make these opportunities and risks more concrete, it may help to think of 
them in terms of the different markets through which intra-Cyprus convergence 
could be a mechanism of growth.  
Economic links between north and south are developing through limited 
channels. Labour market and tourist sector integration, through movement of 
persons across the Green Line, are the main elements. Trade volumes between 
north and south have been rising, but remain low, and there is little or no 
portfolio or direct investment across the Green Line. Overall, the partial 
opening of the divide since 2003 has added some EUR 100 million (9 percent) 
to the GDP of the north, mainly from labour income of workers from the north 
employed in tourism and construction in the south.  
First, the labour market has begun to function substantially. We know relatively 
little about how it is affecting prices and wages, but a recent survey by 
Professor Ozay Mehmet and others begins to explore the structural shifts going 
on in the labour market. This suggests that there is not necessarily a net drain of 
skills underway from the economy of the north; but it also draws attention to a 
set of integrated changes that include flows of migrants from Turkey – and the 
need to think carefully how to handle this situation going forward. One aspect 
of the changes underway, at all events, must be to raise wage rates in the north 
(including as migrant and other informal labour is registered).  This makes 
more urgent the pursuit of reforms to enhance productivity in the north. 
Moreover, the social security framework for commuting across the Green Line 
appears in need of attention.  
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Second, in services there is some synergy developing in tourism, but in a very 
informal manner. Both economies are probably gaining, but there is no synergy 
on the provider side. Some efforts have been made to explore joint projects, but 
barriers have surfaced – including property rights. And the dependency of the 
north on package tourism is troubling, since it encourages a pattern of 
development that is not particularly environmentally friendly. In the healthcare 
sector, people in the north are now benefiting from facilities in the south. 
Third, it is clear that the goods market is not working effectively. The volume 
of goods that crosses the Green Line has been rising, but very slowly in terms 
of the potential that is there. Trade with the south is equivalent to some 4 
percent of total exports of goods and services from the north. Flows of goods 
were some CYP 275,000 in the last four months of 2004; CYP 981,000 in 
2005; and CYP 142,000 in the first six weeks of 2006. Little trade passes from 
south to north. The main exports from the north have recently been agricultural 
products, followed by electrical goods and wood and stone products. Other 
workshop sessions will be devoted to that topic, but it is clear that a quantum 
change is needed for this channel to be truly substantive in terms of impact on 
the pattern of economic growth. The problems are quite complex though – 
ranging from taxation to standards and certification, to marketing and design, 
and to consumer psychology as regards the acceptance of goods from across 
the Line. 
Finally, an intra-island capital market is not there, and the capital market in the 
north is not yet fully supporting growth. An integrated capital market could, of 
course, play a key role in supporting economic expansion in the north – in 
combination with know-how and experience in the south in accessing other 
markets. Again, property rights are a major issue for capital market 
development in the north, affecting the scope for SMEs to be a source of 
dynamism, innovation and employment creation. Capital market segregation 
and distortion have costs. And, of course, developments in property ownership 
since 2004 have further complicated issues to be resolved in the future – 
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whether through bilateral legal or broader settlements. In particular, there has 
been further construction on disputed land; and some improvement of 
properties since April 2004 may have been triggered by a clause in the Annan 
Plan (Version V) that took improvements into account in determining the rights 
of a current occupant. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that economic links between the north and Turkey 
are also deepening. These links include sizable financial flows to the north, 
technical assistance in approximating to the acquis communautaire, and help in 
designing and implementing public finance reforms. Available data suggest 
that airline flights between Turkey and the north have been rising at a pace 
exceeding 20 percent per annum. 
This is a mixed picture. It underscores, in several key respects, the costs to the 
economy of the north in the present status quo. Even in narrow economic 
terms, a major drawback of the now-traditional pattern of growth in the north is 
that it involves significant distortions. Those affecting trade are obvious, and 
include sizable informal costs. Moreover, property rights are a major distortion, 
and their impact, as already noted, is rather pervasive – affecting the scope for 
bizonal tourist development and also the form and pace of financial 
development. In other words, economic incentives for the north strongly favour 
reunification. But in the absence of progress on the economic front, the short-
run incentive for firms and service institutions in the north can be to look to 
alternative strategies, in the long-standing setting of monetary union with 
Turkey.  
For the south, too, there are opportunity costs in continuing separation, as the 
economy adjusts to meet the evolving challenges of an increasingly globalized 
service economy. 
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8. Conclusion: Are there Lessons for the Future in Cyprus other Cases? 
Looking at the Cyprus issue from an economic perspective may seem a narrow 
focus, but it does highlight a major risk facing all parties. The passage of time 
could result in incentives and pressures working to make any breakthrough 
progressively less likely. Economic interests can embed separation. 
Uncoordinated reforms can inhibit convergence. Unless other incentives are put 
in place – such as the EU aid package, initiatives that could flow from the 
Annan-Papadoloulos communiqué, and evolution on the trade issue – one could 
face a process of creeping divergence.  
In other words, if economic incentives were indeed to work perversely, they 
could jeopardize the path toward reunification. People would grow apart, not 
together. Reunification initiatives, as they affect the economic domain, could 
be like Gulliver: tied down and immobilized by the Lilliputian threads of daily 
economic life. 
This perspective also suggests a valuable way forward, which could contribute 
to catalyzing a dialogue. Apparently foreshadowed in the 2006 Annan-
Papadopoulos communiqué, this is to establish technical meetings between 
north and south that would provide a forum to study and report back, on a bi-
communal basis, on key isues of mutual concern. While this may in part begin 
with modest and operational issues, it could also come to embrace some of the 
economic questions explored above. It could serve as a channel of 
communication on reform progress and compatibility. It could also call for 
submissions and contributions from other bodies. It could, for example, ask for 
an evaluation of EU experience with fiscal federalism and decentralization in 
the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. Finally, it could explore areas in 
which economic elements of the reunification agenda could be put into place 
bilaterally on a confidence-building basis. 
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This approach could help lead toward a path of convergence and reunification, 
which should be attractive to both sides, under the right conditions. No 
question, the role of a unified, multicultural Cyprus – an EU hub in the East 
Mediterranean, and a global exporter of high quality business, tourism, and 
education services – is an image de marque that could steeply enhance its 
citizens’ prosperity and well-being. It could serve also as a pole of attraction, 
stability and security in the entire region. Good business and good politics, this 
seems a deeply attractive future – and one which, while perishable, is still open 
to Cyprus today. 
The experience so far in Cyprus also suggests some wider lessons.  
First, it illustrates concretely the potential role of certain economic influences 
that can influence progress with conflict resolution in such cases – for example, 
property rights and the impact of a potential settlement on economic growth 
and stability.  
Second, it is an unusual case in terms of progress in legalising trade. The Green 
Line regulation, in effect, gets around a fundamental recognition conflict to 
allow legal bilateral trade to take place between the parties in dispute. As such, 
it has rightly attracted the attention of experts working on problems in the 
Caucasus: informal discussions on this have taken place during the past two 
years – involving experts in Cyprus and the author of this paper.  
In this latter respect, Cyprus may offer a model to exploit in other cases, though 
one that is dependent on three factors: an external actor (e.g., the EU) able to 
press through an agreement; a legal instrument that can be adopted externally 
(e.g., the "Green Line Regulation"); and the identification of local agencies 
such as NGOs – in this case the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce – 
which can act as a formal agent acceptable to both sides for the purposes of 
certification and other legal issues. From the point of view of some actors in 
northern Cyprus, the green Line Regulation has not lived up to some hopes; but 
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for those who have no such legal trading regime it may be a promising avenue 
for progress.  
Third, in the view of some commentators, there are lessons in this case about 
the way in which the EU's capacity to promote solutions evolves once it 
becomes itself a direct party (e.g., one side is the legal representative of a 
member state), compared with possible leverage during the Accession process. 
It can be argued that the EU’s influence is then no longer on a level playing 
field, with one party having voting rights in the Council after Accession. 
Alternatively, it could perhaps be argued that EU membership might actually 
facilitate resolving issues within the broad framework of the acquis 
communautaire, and help foster "deals" and informal pressures that make a 
favourable outcome more likely. At all events, this issue deserves further study, 
since lessons here may be relevant in parts of southeastern Europe, and the 
merits of this issue deserve further exploration. 
Finally, informal organizations such as the Wolfson Cyprus Group have played 
a role in bringing together actors on both sides to debate macro-and 
microeconomic issues of mutual concern. Nonetheless, it has been difficult to 
secure substantive progress without the engagement of the two sides in direct 
talks. This underscores that, while economic analysis and perceptions can be 
important, they are at most co-drivers in what is, at heart, a deeply political 
process.  
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